In the study of epistemology, philosophers are concerned with the epistemological shift. Many seem to blend manipulationism with explanations, suggesting for example that what is required for understanding is an ability associated with mentally manipulating explanations. New York: Routledge, 2011. In recent years epistemology has experienced gradual changes that are critical in human life. (vi) an ability to give q (the right explanation) when given the information p. Here, and unlike in the case of intervening epistemic luck, nothing actually goes awry, and the fact that the belief could easily have been false is owed entirely to the agents being in a bad environment, one with faades nearby. Achievements, unlike mere successes, are regarded as valuable for their own sake, mainly because of the way in which these special sorts of successes come to be. The group designated explanationists by Kelp (2015) share a general commitment to the idea that knowledge of explanations should play a key role in a theory of understanding (for example, Hempel 1965; Salmon 1989; Khalifa 2012; 2013). Pritchard, D. Knowledge and Understanding in A. Fairweather (ed. As Elgin (2007) notes, it is normal practice to attribute scientific understanding to individuals even when parts of the bodies of information that they endorse diverge somewhat from the truth. 121-132. To this end, the first section offers an overview of the different types of understanding discussed in the literature, though their features are gradually explored in more depth throughout later sections. Working hypotheses and idealizations need not, on this line, be viewed as representative of realityidealizations can be taken as useful fictions, and working hypotheses are recognized as the most parsimonious theories on the table without thereby being dubbed as wholly accurate. While the matter of how to think about the incompatibility of knowledge with epistemic luck remains a contentious pointfor instance, here modal accounts (for example, Pritchard 2005) are at odds with lack-of-control accounts (for example, Riggs 2007), few contemporary epistemologists dissent from the comparatively less controversial claim that knowledge excludes luck in a way that true beliefs and sometimes even justified true beliefs do not (see Hetherington (2013) for a dissenting position). Epistemologically, a single-right-answer is believed to underlie each phenomenon, even though experts may not yet have developed a full understanding of the systemic causes that provide an accurate interpretation of some situations. Another seemingly promising lineone that engages with the relation question discussed aboveviews grasping as intimately connected with a certain set of abilities. In such a case, Kvanvig says, this individual acquires an historical understanding of the Comanche dominance of the Southern plains of North America from the late 17th until the late 19th century (2003: 197). Our culture is shifting, Dede argues, not just from valuing the opinions of experts to the participatory culture of YouTube or Facebook, but from understanding knowledge as fixed and linear to a . According to Grimm, cases like Kvanvig admit of a more general characterisation, depending on how the details are filled in. Argues against a factive conception of scientific understanding. Know How. Thirdly, Kelp (2015) has an objection that he thinks all who favor a manipulationist line should find worrying. For example, we might require that the agent make sense of X in a way that is reasonablefew would think that the psychic above is reasonable, though it is beyond the scope of the current discussion to stray into exploring accounts of reasonableness. An overview of wisdom, including its potential relationship to understanding. While Pritchard can agree with Rohwers conclusion that understanding (and specifically as Rohwer is interested in, scientific understanding) is not a species of knowledge, the issue of adjudicating between Rohwers intuition in the case of unifying understanding and the diagnosis Pritchard will be committed to in such a case is complicated. Relation question: What is the grasping relationship? His central claim is that curiosity provides hope for a response-dependent or behaviour-centred explanation of the value of whatever curiosity involves or aims at. Hence, he argues that any propositional knowledge is derivative. In order to illustrate this point, Kvanvig invites us to imagine a case where an individual reads a book on the Comanche tribe, and she thereby acquires a belief set about the Comanche. When considering interesting features that might set understanding apart from propositional knowledge, the idea of grasping something is often mentioned. This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. In this respect, it seems Kelps move against the manipulationist might get off the ground only if certain premises are in play which manipulationists as such would themselves be inclined to resist. It also allows attributions of understanding in the presence of peripheral false beliefs, without going so far as to grant that understanding is present in cases of internally consistent delusionsas such delusions will feature at least some false central beliefs. How should an account of objectual understanding incorporate these types of observationsnamely, where the falsity of a central belief or central beliefs appears compatible with the retention of some degree of understanding? As such, his commentary here is particularly relevant to the question of whether gasping is factive. Trout, J.D. That is, there is something defective about a scientists would-be understanding of gas behavior were that scientist, unlike all other competent scientists, to reject that the ideal gas law is an idealization and instead embraced it as a fact. Orand this is a point that has received little attentioneven more weakly, can the true beliefs be themselves unreliably formed or held on the basis of bad reasons. In this Gettier-style case, she has good reason to believe her true beliefs, but the source of these beliefs (for example, the rumor mill) is highly unreliable and this makes her beliefs only luckily true, in the sense of intervening epistemic luck. One point that could potentially invite criticism is the move from (1) and (2) to (3). According to Elgin, a factive conception of understanding neither reflects our practices in ascribing understanding nor does justice to contemporary science. The epistemological shift in the present In the study of epistemology, philosophers are concerned with the epistemological shift. In other words, even though there is no such gas as that referred to in the law, accepting the law need not involve believing the law to be true and thus believing there to be some gas with properties that it lacks. It will accordingly be helpful to narrow our focus to the varieties of understanding that feature most prominently in the epistemological literature. ), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. To the extent that this is right, Zagzebski is endorsing a kind of KU principle (compare: KK). However, Strevens nonetheless offers a rough outline of a parallel, non-factive account of grasping, what he calls grasping*. An overview of the background, development and recent issues in epistemology, including a chapter on understanding as an epistemic good. For example, you read many of your books on screens and e-readers today. That said, this article nonetheless attempts to outline a selection of topics that have generated the most discussion and highlights what is at issue in each case and what some of the available positions are. This entry surveys the varieties of cognitive success, and some recent efforts to understand some of those varieties. Discuss the pros and cons of the epistemological shift in an essay. 824 Words. Riaz (2015), Rohwer (2014) and Morris (2012) have continued to uphold this line on understandings compatibility with epistemic luck and defend this line against some of the objections that are examined below. He suggests that manipulating the system allows the understander to see the way in which the manipulation influences (or fails to influence) other parts of the system (2011: 11). In practice, individuals' epistemological beliefs determine how they think knowledge or truth can be comprehended, what problems - if any - are associated with various views of pursuing and presenting knowledge and what role researchers play in its discovery (Robson, 2002). He takes his account to be roughly in line with the laymans concept of curiosity. It focuses on means of human knowledge acquisition and how to differentiate the truth knowledge claims from the false one. If so, why, and if not why not? Displacements of power in the realm of concepts accompany these new orientations. Strevens (2013) focuses on scientific understanding in his discussion of grasping. For example, when the issue is understanding mathematics, as opposed to understanding why 22=4, it is perhaps less obvious that dependence has a central role to play. The Case of Richard Rorty A Newer Argument Pro: Hales's Defense o. If we sometimes attribute understanding to two people even when they differ only in terms of who has more false beliefs about a subject, this difference in degrees indicates that one can have understanding that includes some false beliefs. Resists Pritchards claim that there can be weak achievements, that is, ones that do not necessarily involve great effort. Firstly, grasping is often used in such a way such that it is not clear whether it should be understood metaphorically or literally. Strevens, M. No Understanding Without Explanation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44 (2013): 510-515. A central component of Kvanvigs argument is negative; he regards knowledge as ill-suited to play the role of satisfying curiosity, and in particular, by rejecting three arguments from Whitcomb to this effect. Unlike de Regt and Dieks (2005), Wilkenfeld aims to propose an inclusive manipulation-based view that allows agents to have objectual understanding even if they do not have a theory of the phenomenon in question. Argues that the ordinary concept of knowledge is not factive and that epistemologists should therefore not concern themselves with said ordinary concept. 57-74, 2015. Rationalism is an epistemological theory, so rationalism can be interpreted the distinct aspects or parts of the mind that are separate senses. In other words, each denies all of the others respective beliefs about the subject, and yet the weak view in principle permits that they might nonetheless understand the subject equally well. Another significant paper endorsing the claim that knowledge of explanations should play a vital role in our theories of understanding. For example, a self-proclaimed psychic might see someone trip and believe that he caused this persons fall. Zagzebski (2001) and Kvanvig (2003), have suggested that understandings immunity to being undermined by the kinds of epistemic luck which undermine knowledge is one of the most important ways in which understanding differs from knowledge. The Pros And Cons Of Epistemology. It is helpful to consider an example. Should we say that the use of the term understanding that applies to such cases should be of no interest to epistemology? The distinctive aspects can be identified as human abilities to engage in mathematics and intellectual reasoning. Riggs (2003: 21-22) asks whether an explanation has to be true to provide understanding, and Strevens thinks that it is implied that grasping is factive. View Shift in Epistemology.edited.docx from SOCIOLOGY 1010 at Columbia Southern University. It is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge (Rayner, 2011).The fact that taking in knowledge has altered is evident in learning institutions today. Kvanvig, J. Owing to Kvanvigs use of the words perceived achievement, Grimm thinks that the curiosity account of understandings value suggests that subjective understanding (or what is referred to as intelligibility above) can satisfy the desire to make sense of the world or really marks the legitimate end of inquiry.. In order to make this point clear, Pritchard suggests that we first consider two versions of a case analogous with Kvanvigs. The notion of curiosity that plays a role in Kvanvigs line is a broadly inclusive one that is meant to include not just obvious problem-solving examples but also what he calls more spontaneous examples, such as turning around to see what caused a noise you just heard. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. The thought is that, in cases of achievement, the relevant success must be primarily creditable to the exercise of the agents abilities, rather than to some other factor (for example, luck). Your paper should be 3-4 pages in length, not counting the Title page and Reference page. What kind of historical enterprise is historical epistemology? Pritchard, D. The Value of Knowledge: Understanding. In A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. Pritchard (eds. New York: Routledge, 2011. In other words, they claim that one cannot always tell that one understands. His view is that understanding requires the agent to, in counterfactual situations salient to the context, be able to modify their mental representation of the subject matter. Baker, L. R. Third Person Understanding in A. Sanford (ed. For example, in Whitcomb (2010: 8), we find the observation that understanding is widely taken to be a higher epistemic good: a state that is like knowledge and true belief, but even better, epistemically speaking. Meanwhile, Pritchard (2009: 11) notes as we might be tempted to put the point, we would surely rather understand than merely know. A helpful clarification here comes from Grimm (2012: 105), who in surveying the literature on the value of understanding points out that the suggestion seems to be that understanding (of a complex of some kind) is better than the corresponding item of propositional knowledge. Further, suppose that the self-proclaimed psychic even has reason to believe he is right to think he is psychic, as his friends and family deem that it is safer or kinder to buy into his delusions outwardly. Elgin, C. Exemplification, Idealization, and Understanding in M. Surez (ed. In the study of epistemology, philosophers are concerned with the epistemological shift. An overview of coherentism that can be useful when considering how theories of coherence might be used to flesh out the grasping condition on understanding. An in-depth exploration of different types of epistemic luck. Van Camp, W. Explaining Understanding (or Understanding Explanation. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4(1) (2014): 95-114. The guiding task was to clarify what versions of historical epistemology exist and the pros and cons each of them presents. as in testimony cases in friendly environments, where knowledge acquisition demands very little on the part of the agent), he argues that cognitive achievement is not essentially wedded to knowledge (as robust virtue epistemologists would hold). Or, should we adopt a more relaxed view of what would be required to satisfy this conditionnamely, a view that focuses on the way the agent connects information. As Kvanvig sees it, knowing requires non-accidental links between (internal) mental states and external events in just the right way. Since, for instance, the ideal gas law (for example, Elgin 2007) is recognized as a helpful fiction and is named and taught as such, as is, nave Copernicanism or the simple view that humans evolved from apes. There is little work focusing exclusively on the prospects of a non-factive construal of understanding-why; most authors, with a few exceptions, take it that understanding-why is obviously factive in a way that is broadly analogous to propositional knowledge. That said, Hills adds some qualifications. In addition, the weak view leaves it open that two agents might count as understanding some subject matter equally well in spite of the fact that for every relevant belief that one has, the other agent maintains its denial. Outlines a view on which understanding something requires making reasonable sense of it. Zagzebski does not mean to say that to understand X, one must also understand ones own understanding of X (as this threatens a psychologically implausible regress), but rather, that to understand X one must also understand that one understands X. Positivism follows an identical approach as the study of natural sciences in the testing of a theory. The conspiracy theorist possesses something which one who grasps (rather than grasps*) a correct theory also possesses, and yet one who fails to grasp* even the conspiracy theory (for example, a would-be conspiracy theorist who has yet to form a coherent picture of how the false propositions fit together) lacks. Pros and Cons of Epistemological Shift Epistemology refers to a dynamic concept that shows how humans understand knowledge, which entails how it is received, classified, justified, and transmitted in distinctive ways and at different periods in history. If, as robust virtue epistemologists have often insisted, cognitive achievement is finally valuable (that is, as an instance of achievements more generally), and understanding necessarily lines up with cognitive achievement but knowledge only sometimes does, then the result is a revisionary story about epistemic value. Of course, though, just as Lackey (2007) raises creationist teacher style cases against knowledge transmission principles, one might as well raise a parallel kind of creationist teacher case against the thesis that one cannot attain understanding from a source who herself lacks it. ), Fictions in Science: Essays on Idealization and Modeling. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. However, it is not entirely clear that extant views on understanding fall so squarely into these two camps. Greco, J. Whitcomb, D. Wisdom. In S. Bernecker and D. Pritchard (eds. This paper proposes a revisionist view of epistemic value and an outline of different types of understanding. Due to the possibility of overly simple or passive successes qualifying as cognitive achievements (for example, coming to truly believe that it is dark just by looking out of the window in normal conditions after 10pm), Pritchard cautions that we should distinguish between two classes of cognitive achievementstrong and weak: Weak cognitive achievement: Cognitive success that is because of ones cognitive ability. It is just dumb luck the genuine sheep happened to be in the field. The Varieties of Cognitive Success 1.1 What Kinds of Things Enjoy Cognitive Success? This type of understanding is ascribed in sentences that take the form I understand why X (for example, I understand why the house burnt down). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. To borrow a case from Riggs, stealing an Olympic medal or otherwise cheating to attain it lacks the kind of value one associates with earning the medal, through ones own skill. Considers some of the ramifications that active externalist approaches might have for epistemology. An earlier paper defending the intellectualist view of know-how. That said, Grimms more recent work (2014) expands on these earlier observations to form the basis of a view that spells out grasping in terms of a modal relationship between properties, objects or entitiesa theory on which what is grasped when one has understanding-why will be how changes in one would lead (or fail to lead) to changes in the other. Kvanvig does not spell out what grasping might involve, in the sense now under consideration, in his discussion of coherence, and the other remarks we considered above. For a less concessionary critique of Kvanvigs Comanche case, however, see Grimm (2006). If we consider some goalsuch as the successful completion of a coronary bypassit is obvious that our attitude towards the successful coronary bypass is different when the completion is a matter of ability as opposed to luck. Questions about when and what type of understanding is required for permissible assertion connect with issues related to expertise. In other words, S knows that p only if p is true. More generally, though, it is important to note that Khalifa, via his grasping argument, is defending reliable explanatory evaluation as merely a necessarythough not sufficientcomponent of grasping. and Pritchard, D. Varieties of Externalism. Philosophical Issues 41(1) (2014): 63-109. The childs opinion displays some grasp of evolution. Kvanvig, J. The topic of epistemic value has only relatively recently received sustained attention in mainstream epistemology. On the most straightforward characterization of her proposal, one fails to possess understanding why, with respect to p, if one lacks any of the abilities outlined in (i-vi), with respect to p. Note that this is compatible with one failing to possess understanding why even if one possesses knowledge that involves, as virtue epistemologists will insist, some kinds of abilities or virtues. In looking at moral understanding-why, outlines some key abilities that may be necessary to the grasping component of understanding. Therefore, the need to adopt a weak factivity constraint on objectual understandingat least on the basis of cases that feature idealizationslooks at least initially to be unmotivated in the absence of a more sophisticated view about the relationship between factivity, belief and acceptance (however, see Elgin 2004). This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. Running head: SHIFT IN EPISTEMOLOGY 1 Shift in Epistemology Student's Name Professor's Name Institution So, understanding is compatible with a kind of epistemic luck that knowledge excludes. Explores understanding as the proper goal of inquiry, in addition to discussing understandings distinctive value. Explores the epistemological role of exemplification and aims to illuminate the relationship between understanding and scientific idealizations construed as fictions. Running head: SHIFT IN EPISTEMOLOGY 1 Shift in Epistemology Student's Name Professor's Name Institution Cases of intervening luck taketo use a simple examplethe familiar pattern of Chisholms sheep in a field case, where an agent sees a sheep-shaped rock which looks just like a sheep, and forms the belief There is a sheep. More generally, as this line of criticism goes, sometimes we simply mistake mere (non-factive) intelligibility for understanding. Elgin, C. Z. In particular, one might be tempted to suggest that some of the objections raised to Grimms non-propositional knowledge-of-causes model could be recast as objections to Khalifas own explanation-based view. ), The Stanford Enclopedia of Philosophy. Kvanvig (2013) claims that both of these views are mistaken, and in the course of doing so, locates curiosity at the center of his account of understandings value. Wilkenfeld (2013) offers the account that most clearly falls under Kelps characterization of manipulationist approaches to understanding. One can split views on this question into roughly three positions that advocate varying strengths of a factivity constraint on objectual understanding. Khalifa, K. Is Understanding Explanatory or Objectual? Synthese 190(6) (2013a): 1153-1171. Summary This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Introduction Arguments Con Arguments Pro Ambivalence Concerning Relativism? Since it is central to her take on human evolution, factivists like Kvanvig must conclude that her take on human evolution does not qualify as understanding. Salmon, W. Four Decades of Scientific Explanation. In Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. The Value of Understanding In D. Pritchard, A. Haddock and A. Millar (eds. Early defence of explanations key role in understanding. Discussion of pros and cons Evaluates the epistemological shift, in the present or in the future, indicating whether the shift is good or bad. Pritchard, meanwhile, claims that the matter of understandings compatibility with epistemic luck can be appreciated only against the background of a distinction between two kinds of epistemic luckintervening and environmentalboth of which are incompatible with knowledge. But more deeply, atemporal phenomena such as mathematical truths have, in one clear sense, never come to be at all, but have always been, to the extent that they are the case at all. However, such a strong view would also make understanding nearly unobtainable and surely very rarefor example, on the extremely strong proposal under consideration, recognized experts in a field would be denied understanding if they had a single false belief about some very minor aspect of the subject matter. While Pritchards point here is revealed in his diagnosis of Kvanvigs reading of the Comanche case, he in several places prefers to illustrate the idea with reference to the case in which an agent asks a real (that is, genuine, authoritative) fire officer about the cause of a house fire and receives a correct explanation. Rohwers inventive move involves a contrast case featuring unifying understanding, that is, understanding that is furnished from multiple sources, some good and some bad. Such a constraint would preserve the intuition that understanding is a particularly desirable epistemic good and would accordingly be untroubled by the issues highlighted for the weakest view outlined at the start of the section. This objection is worth holding in mind when considering any further positions that incorporate representation manipulability as necessary. View Shift in Epistemology.docx from SOCIOLOGY 1010 at Columbia Southern University. Hills, A. Argues that we should replace the main developed accounts of understanding with earlier accounts of scientific explanation. Specifically, he takes his opponents view to be that knowledge through direct experience is what sates curiosity, a view that traces to Aristotle. A. and Gordon, E. C. Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support. Philosophia 39(4) (2011): 615-635. Pritchard, D. Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value In A. OHear (ed. But it is not strictly true. For example, you read many of your books on screens and e-readers today. 115, No. This line merits discussion not least because the idea that understanding-why comes by degrees is often ignored in favor of discussing the more obvious point that understanding a subject matter clearly comes by degrees. Even so, and especially over the past decade, there has been agreement amongst most epistemologists working on epistemic value that that understanding is particularly valuable (though see Janvid 2012 for a rare dissenting voice). This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. ), The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations. Establishes a pro position, supporting that the shift in how people take in knowledge is good. For example, Carter and Gordon (2011) consider that there might be cases in which understanding, and not just knowledge, is the required epistemic credential to warrant assertion. He also suggests that what epistemic agents want is not just to feel like they are making sense of things but to actually make sense of them. Abstract. Regarding factivity, then, it seems there is room for a view that occupies the middle ground here. Consider, for instance, the felicity of the question: Am I understanding this correctly? and I do not know if I understand my own defense mechanisms; I think I understand them, but I am not sure. The other side of the coin is that one often can think that one understands things that one does not (for example, Trout 2007).